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Among Aristotle’s philosophical contributions that attract a lot of interest, 
his approach to practical inference is a prime example. Elizabeth Anscombe, 
one leading modern contributor on that topic, came to the conclusion that 
Aristotle had kept clear of confusions that still dominate this field, confusions 
she herself had been subject to.1 However, Anscombe does not provide 
detailed representations of how the account of practical inference is supposed 
to work. She does not go into questions of how the central Aristotelian terms 
of προαίρεσις and βούλευσις are to be understood, or the interesting relations 
to εὐδαιμονία.
One very important point, according to Anscombe, is that Aristotle did not 
think formal correctness conditions were any different in the practical case 
than they were in the theoretical case. That means that the difference between 
the practical and the theoretical is to be captured in the use we make of the 
contents we relate to in inferring. Add to this that the conclusion in the practical 
case might simply be the action, and you have a challenge. It follows directly 
that we must see the action as a way of relating to a propositional content. 
I am far from being a scholar of Aristotle, and I claim no expertise whatsoever 
in Aristotle scholarship. There is nevertheless a possibility that some of the 
things that we modern philosophers pursue might help us understand him. In 
this chapter I shall suggest a way of thinking about practical reasoning that 
satisfies the basic points identified by Anscombe as Aristotle’s view. I leave 
it to scholars of Aristotle to judge whether this is interesting for interpreting 
his works.
Fregean inferential structures
I shall use the Fregean judgment stroke to represent the way we relate to a 
content and index the stroke so as to mark whether it is a normal theoretical 
judgment we are speaking about, or whether we are speaking about the 
Aristotelian practical way of being related to a propositional content. In the 
first case, I index with a ‘J’ for judgment; in the latter I use a ‘P’ for practical. 
To see inference as a transition from some judgments to another is the Classical 
way, and this was upheld by Frege but mainly lost from view in philosophy 
1 See Anscombe 1995, 21.
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after him.2 Let us start with a case of simple modus ponens, and let us also 
note that there are some delicate issues with how to express the propositions 
that describe what we do in English, issues that are less pressing in some other 
languages. The second premise must not be read as a habitual.
1a. |-J (I am driving to Stockholm)
2a. |-J (If I am driving to Stockholm, I am turning left at crossing X)
3a. |-J (This is crossing X)
-------------------
4a. |-J (I am turning left)
What is extra here, compared with the standard way of thinking about inference, 
is the presence of the indexed judgment stroke. Let us work with the aim of 
capturing the concept of legitimate inference, where inference is such that 
one reaches a conclusion legitimately when everything is correct (and thereby 
legitimate) in each premise. The added level brings with it the possibility that 
each premise is legitimately held, and also that legitimately held premises yield 
a legitimately held conclusion when the inference is legitimate. In that case, 
the inference is knowledge extending. We can therefore note the possibility 
of raising the issue of legitimacy on at least two levels. We can, especially if 
we do virtue epistemology, move further onto levels of aptness in terms of the 
way we relate to contents, and also in terms of inferring. 
This example above is deliberatively chosen because we can also use it in 
a case of practical reasoning. The only difference between the two cases is in 
the way we relate to the propositional contents or thoughts, not in the thoughts 
or the way they relate semantically and formally. Here is the example (with 
the same stipulation about premise 2).
1b. |-P (I am driving to Stockholm)
2b. |-J (If I am driving to Stockholm, I am turning left at crossing X)
3b. |-J (This is crossing X)
---------------
4b. |-P (I am turning left)
Most of the things said about legitimacy in the cases of the theoretical inference 
above carry over to this inference as well. The main difference is that here we 
have a practical way of relating to one premise and also to the conclusion. I 
2 The main conception these days starts from a notion of logical concequence, seen as holding between 
propositions. I will not go further into this or Frege scholarship here, and I refer to Nicholas Smith (2009) 
for discussions and references.
165Some Aristotelian concepts: practical inference
shall maintain that we need a practical way of relating to a premise in order 
to find a practical way to the conclusion, and I argue in some detail for this 
in Gjelsvik 2013.3 The richness of this quasi-Aristotelian approach becomes 
even more striking when one considers a practical inference on the model of 
the theoretical.
The practical case
Let me make some remarks about the practical case. First, the practical case as 
exhibited here is very close to Anscombe’s late account of practical inference.4 
In fact, or so I shall claim, the ‘|-P’ symbol stands exactly for what Anscombe 
in Intention called practical knowledge – something she claimed philosophy 
had forgotten all about, i.e. a legitimate way of being practically related to a 
content.5 When you are thus related to a proposition, you are, in the central 
case, engaged in doing intentionally the propositional content to which you 
relate. (This is phrased awkwardly, but that should not deter us). In our example 
there are two such propositional contents, ‘I am driving to Stockholm’ and 
‘I am turning left’. In both cases – the practical premise and the practical 
conclusion – we take the whole premise to represent an intentional action. 
I agree with Anscombe that being so related to a propositional content, i.e. 
‘I am driving to Stockholm’, implies an awareness of me being engaged in 
driving to Stockholm. This awareness is a way of knowing that I am driving 
to Stockholm. Doing something intentionally thus carries non-observational 
knowledge of what you are engaged in doing with it. This knowledge is 
propositional.
There are further issues here concerning the point that an intentional action 
exemplifies knowledge of how to do the thing in question. Such knowledge 
must be employed with success for the intentional action to be there. I shall 
not take a stand here on how to think about knowing how to x, and at this point 
I want to remain neutral on the contested and controversial questions about 
the relationship between knowledge how to something and knowledge that.6 
Intellectualists, philosophers who advocate the reduction of knowledge 
how to do something to knowledge that, operate with practical ways of 
being related to constituents of propositions or thoughts. That is, however, 
not the same as the practical way of being related to the whole proposition 
3 See Gjelsvik 2013. Jay Wallace made a good case for this in Wallace 2001.
4 In ‘Practical Inference’ (Anscombe 1995), first written for the von Wright volume of Library of Living 
Philosophers. 
5 See Anscombe 1957, 57.
6 Jason Stanley (2011) is an important new contribution I shall not engage with here.
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about which I am speaking. As I said, I will not be going into issues about 
knowledge how to do something, I just stress the need to operate with a 
practical way of being related to whole propositions when thinking about 
doing something intentionally. This illustrates some of the complexities in the 
relationship between Anscombe’s Aristotelian use of practical knowledge and 
the discussion about Ryle’s distinction between knowing how to do something 
and knowing that.7
Enkrasia (and akrasia)
Let me close with some detailed examples of a theoretical and a parallel 
practical inference, before going on to show how enkratic inference (the 
opposite of akratic) can be dealt with on the present approach. The first 
example is interesting because it shows how to extend the practical way of 
relating to a proposition to the case of intentions. There are no conditional 
actions, but there are conditional intentions. The central case, the case of 
doing something intentionally, thus needs to be extended to intentions and 
conditional intentions. A great deal of practical reasoning, as Michael Bratman 
has shown, concerns plans within plans, and relations between intentions. 
Without discussing all of that, I shall just provide an example with intentions.
5a. |-J (If I ought to take a break, then I shall take a break)
6a. |-J (I ought to take a break soon)
-----------------------------
7a. |-J (I shall take a break soon)
The practical analogue to this must be reasoning between two intentions, 
which is shown by the way ‘shall’ enters the actual content. We still represent 
the reasoning in the same way as that of action:
5b. |-P (If I ought to take a break, then I shall take a break)
6b. |-J (I ought to take a break now)
---------------------
7b. |-P (I shall take a break now)
The enkratic case is Broome’s case, in which you move by inference from the 
recognition that you ought to take a break to the intention to take a break (see 
Broome 2013). ‘B’ stands for the attitude of believing by this rendering of 
7 As discussed in Stanley 2011.
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Broome’s approach, and has a parallel, but not a full parallel, in the judgement 
stroke on my approach. The ‘I’ stands for the attitude of intending on Broome’s 
approach, and has a parallel, but not a full parallel, in the practical stroke on my 
approach. I use the letters in this way for comparative purposes; I do not think 
it causes any problems. (I use the strokes to indicate legitimate ways of being 
related to propositions). This is the practical inference according to Broome:
8. B (I ought to take a break)
_______
9. I (I shall take a break)
To be precise: in Broome’s view this reasoning is enthymematic: I also need 
to believe that it is up to me whether I take a break or not. The full and correct 
representation of the inference is something like this:
8. B (I ought to take a break)
8*. B (It is up to me whether or not I take a break.)
_______
9. I (I shall take a break)
According to the view I am pursuing, this is not correct reasoning, and Broome 
is wrong. There is a logical step from the modal verb ‘ought’ to the modal 
verb ‘shall’ which is not correct – satisfying the one modal predicate does not 
entail satisfying the other. (But there is a sense of ‘shall’ which is close to the 
predictive sense of ‘will’, as that notion enters first person intentions.)
This is the correct practical inference in my view:
10. |-P (If I ought to take a break then I shall take a break)
11. |-J (I ought to take a break)
12. |-P (I shall take a break)
Without the first premise being true of you, you will not reach the conclusion. 
We should note that it is not enough to judge the first premise to be true – you 
have to have adopted the practical way of relating to the first premise to be 
able to infer this conclusion. If you only judge the propositional content of 
the first premise to be true, but do not relate to it practically, then you might 
exhibit akrasia or weak will in this case. This shows that weak will is not 
typically a failure of reasoning (as it would be in Broome’s account), and it 
also indicates why we need a practical way of relating to a premise in order to 
reach a practical conclusion. 
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We should also note that we may endorse different general truths from 
which different actions would follow, like ‘taking a break is good’, ‘eating 
something sweet is good’. It cannot be practically known that more than one 
of them ought to be acted upon at a particular time. And we might, in real life, 
be practically committed to the wrong one at one time, and at that time eat 
something sweet instead of taking a break when we know (theoretically) that 
we ought to take a break. In that case we fail to exhibit the practical knowledge 
of 10 above, something which is compatible with theoretical knowledge as 
exhibited in 5a. This distinction between ways of knowing therefore seems to 
do the work of Aristotle’s distinction between different ways of knowing in 
his account of akrasia.
This demonstrates the ability of the present approach to practical inference 
to handle some of the most contested issues in the discussion of practical 
inference. And there is more: in recent discussions, the role of rationality 
requirements in practical inference, their form, whether they are wide in scope 
or narrow, and so forth have been dominant.8 I submit from the perspective 
of the present approach to inference that we have all the resources we need in 
terms of relating to propositional content, and there is no point in going into 
the issue of rationality requirements when accounting for inference. Or rather, 
all the work that can be done by rationality requirements will be done by the 
resources we already have at our disposal by what goes into the legitimate 
ways of relating to propositional content, both practical and theoretical. 
Work is also done by the interaction between judging and inferring, and the 
recognition that inferential connections may force us to reconsider some of the 
judgings to which we are committed: if a conclusion of a valid inference must 
be rejected, we must reject at least one premise. That goes for both theoretical 
and practical inference. The great virtue of the present approach is the way we 
get a full parallel between practical and theoretical inference in this matter, 
and a full parallel in the way entailment relations matter. This was indeed 
Anscombe’s Aristotelian aim. If we were to extend the present approach to 
hypothetical thinking, then we might, as an additional benefit, be able to see 
the structure of reductio arguments as fully parallel and as arising out of some 
hypothetical premises that lead to unacceptable conclusions. Of course, we 
engage in such reasoning all the time. Any full approach to inference needs to 
deal with that. I return to this kind of extension in the concluding overview, but 
let me just say that I want to remain neutral on how to extend to hypothetical 
judgments, and also that from the present perspective we start from the 
8 There is now a huge body of literature on this topic. Important contributors are Broome 2003, 2010 and 
2013, and Kolodny 2005.
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categorical in both the theoretical and the practical case. The extension to the 
hypothetical may take quite different forms in the two cases.
This concludes the discussion of enkratic inference. Let me end by 
appending one further point. Keeping the practical case in sight makes it 
easy to see how difficult it is to think of inferring as something that we do 
intentionally. If we do, it will result in a vicious regress in the practical case: 
if we think of inferring as a way of being practically related to a propositional 
content, as we would be if the action was intentional, then it should also be 
possible for that intentional action of inferring to be able to be a conclusion of 
another practical inference, and so forth. The problem is not solved as long as 
you think of the transition as something that we do intentionally, and think of 
doing something intentionally along the present lines.
Upshot and some hypotheses
With this outline in mind, let me briefly indicate my current guess as to 
how this relates to understanding concepts like βούλευσις, προαίρεσις, 
and εὐδαιμονία. (Guessing is, of course, always more fun than serious 
scholarship!) Dogmatically put, the practical way of relating to a content stands 
to εὐδαιμονία as the theoretical stands to truth. Truth essentially characterizes 
judging something to be a certain way, as its formal end, and intentional action 
is similarly characterized by having εὐδαιμονία as its formal end. Virtue will 
then be characterized as the legitimate or right way of relating to such an end. 
The issue of whether εὐδαιμονία is entirely formal or also an external end in 
some sense of material end is not an issue which will be dealt with here – the 
point is that it is an end that we do pursue in some sense of pursuing.
Βούλευσις is thus seen as resulting in a theoretical way of relating to a 
practical issue – a theoretical conclusion about the means to the end you pursue/
are pursuing. It is essentially related to truth, and is a product of inquiry (when 
that is needed). It is also typically what we reason about, since we reason from 
the point of view of the end we pursue/are pursuing. But the end we pursue is 
typically also a means to a higher end, and we can, therefore, relate practically 
and theoretically to the same propositional content at different times. We can 
also relate to the same content in different ways at the same time when we 
relate theoretically to what we are doing in being aware of what we do.
Προαίρεσις is thus seen as integrating what βούλευσις provides into a new 
action through practical reasoning: the conclusion as that is here conceived 
of (and in doing so generates a new βούλησις that makes up the motivation 
with which one acts in the action that makes up the conclusion). The standard 
translation into English of προαίρεσις is often ‘choice’. We can now see 
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how that translation carries with it some difficulties, since modern thinkers 
typically read into choice something different from this. Προαίρεσις may 
not, for instance, involve a choice between alternatives. On the other hand, 
it is an achievement in action to continue to pursue a higher end in light of 
the reasoning you carry out about how to do that. This achievement can also 
be subjected to considerations relating to virtue in how to go about it, as 
βούλευσις can be subjected to quite different virtue considerations. I shall not 
go into these here, however, or theorize about them.9
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